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INTRODUCTION 
In New York City, owners violated zoning regulations and opened up 
their basements, garages, and other floors to rent to people (particularly 
low-income immigrants) priced out of the formal market.1  The more than 
100,000 illegal dwelling units in New York City (NYC) were referred to as 
“granny units,” “illegal twos or threes,” or “accessory units.”2  Due to the 
safety and habitability considerations of “alter[ing] or modif[ying] of an 
existing building to create an additional housing unit without first obtaining 
approval from the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB),” the 
City government devoted a lot of resources to detecting and stopping such 
illegal conversion.3  Recently, however, Mayor Bill de Blasio proposed to 
legalize such illegal dwelling units to increase the City’s rent-regulated 
housing stock. 4   The question remains as to whether crackdown or 
legalization is the right policy. 
Such illegal housing is not unique to NYC.  Shenzhen, a city in south 
China that experienced a population explosion from 300,000 to over 10 
million within three decades, faces the same problem as NYC: legal 
housing supply cannot catch up with the population growth, resulting in 
prevalent illegal housing supply.5  Almost half of Shenzhen’s buildings 
have been built illegally and now host over eight million migrant workers 
and low-income residents.6  In the past three decades, the Shenzhen city 
government has swung between legalization and crackdown of such illegal 
buildings, neither of which has resolved the problem.7  Due to the large 
number of illegal apartments, the “crackdown” option has proven to be 
impossible, while legalization has incurred huge information costs and 
encouraged more illegal constructions.  In more recent years, though, the 
Shenzhen city government has discovered an effective policy: Keeping the 
city government’s zoning power intact while granting an option to owners 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. CHHAYA CMT. DEV. CORP., ILLEGAL DWELLING UNITS: A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY 3 (Aug. 14, 2008), http://chhayacdc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2008/10/Illegal-Dwelling-Units-A-Potential-Source-of-Affordable-
Housing-in-New-York-City.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8G3-NB7U] [hereinafter CHHAYA CDC]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Illegal Conversions, N.Y.C. BUILDINGS, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/buildings/renter/illegal-conversions-vacates.page 
[https://perma.cc/8K2Q-8X7W] (last visited Apr. 5, 2017). 
 4. Mireya Navarro, Looser Rules on Illegal Housing Sought, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/nyregion/looser-rules-on-illegal-housing-
sought.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3U74-954B]. 
 5. Shitong Qiao, Small Property, Big Market: A Focal Point Explanation, 63 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 197, 207-08 (2015). 
 6. Id. at 201. 
 7. See infra Section II.C. 
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of illegal housing to buy an exemption.8  The lesson from Shenzhen is that 
options matter at least as much as the allocation of initial entitlements.  In 
the case of prevalent zoning violations, these options should be granted to 
parties that have the best information to make decisions—the numerous 
individual owners rather than the government.  I propose that this optional 
zoning approach should be taken in dealing with illegal housing in New 
York City. 
Part I of this article details illegal housing in New York City, including 
the three main challenges: namely, information costs, externality, and 
heterogeneity in dealing with illegal housing.  Part II discusses how 
Shenzhen dealt with illegal buildings with the same challenges.  Part III 
concludes with a preliminary proposal of community-based zoning options 
for New York City.   
I.  ILLEGAL HOUSING IN NEW YORK 
Overcrowding and undersupply of affordable housing have led to a surge 
in illegal apartments throughout NYC.9  The typical migrant worker in 
Chinatown, Manhattan or Flushing, Queens is likely to live in an illegal 
location under the current NYC zoning law. 10   In Jackson Heights, 
Queens, or similar neighborhoods, houses originally designed for a nuclear 
family are being occupied by multiple extended families, including cousins, 
aunts, and uncles.11  Resorting to illegal housing is a problem not limited to 
immigrants.  Even in the Upper East Side of Manhattan, real estate brokers 
occasionally show young professionals suspiciously low priced units which 
turned out to be basements without independent mailboxes.12  The Pratt 
Center for Community Development (Pratt Center) and Chhaya 
Community Development Corporation (Chhaya CDC) estimated that 
between 300,000 and 500,000 New Yorkers live in housing units that do 
not legally exist.13  The Pratt Center report found that NYC gained 114,000 
apartments not reflected in the official number of certificates of occupancy 
the City granted for new construction or renovation between 1990 and 
                                                                                                                                         
 8. See infra Section II.C.3.  For a more comprehensive picture on the Shenzhen 
Government’s policies, see Qiao, Small Property, Big Market: A Focal Point Explanation，  
supra note 5, at 207-12. 
 9. See CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 3. 
 10. Interview with a worker in Chinatown, in New York, N.Y. (Jan. 11, 2014). 
 11. Sarah Wesseler, Inequality and Informality in New York: SITU Studio’s Proposal for 
MoMA’s Uneven Growth Exhibition, ARCH DAILY (Jan. 19, 2015), 
http://www.archdaily.com/589157/inequality-and-informality-in-new-york-situ-studio-s-
proposal-for-moma-s-uneven-growth-exhibition [https://perma.cc/6NZK-DSBP]. 
 12. The author had such a personal experience. 
 13. Robert Neuwirth, NEW YORK’S HOUSING UNDERGROUND: A REFUGE AND RESOURCE 
2-3 (Pratt Ctr. for Cmty. Dev. & Chhaya Cmt. Dev. Corp., 2008) [hereinafter PRATT-
CHHAYA REPORT]. 
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2000.14  Chhaya CDC also conducted a door-to-door survey in Jackson 
Heights and the Briarwood/Jamaica section of Queens and found that 35% 
of the total units examined (155 out of 446 homes) had separate secondary 
basement units.15  The Citizens Housing and Planning Council estimated 
that nearly 42,000 new housing units in Queens, none of which were 
recorded in the official system, amounted to 73% of Queens’ total housing 
growth from 1990 to 2000.16 
According to the DOB, “an illegal conversion is an alteration or 
modification of an existing building to create an additional housing unit 
without first obtaining approval.”17  Examples of these illegal conversions 
include creating (without obtaining approval or permits from the DOB) an 
apartment in the basement, attic, or garage of a property zoned or 
designated for manufacturing or industrial use, or dividing an apartment 
into single room occupancies.18  New York City has used ineffective law 
enforcement measures to combat the growing prevalence of illegal 
housing.19  Although scholars and policy advocates suggest legalization as 
a solution to this problem, it remains unclear whether legalization is the 
best course of action either.20  I examine both solutions in detail in the 
following sections. 
A. Legal Enforcement:  Too Many to Fail 
The New York City government has strong incentive to take measures to 
enforce the zoning and building codes.  The government has warned that 
illegal housing poses serious safety risks because non-compliance with 
Building and Fire Safety Codes creates potentially unsafe living 
conditions.21  In addition, the overcrowding caused by illegal housing may 
overburden surrounding essential services, reducing a neighborhood’s 
quality of life, and local businesses may suffer from further reducing 
already-limited industrial and manufacturing space in NYC.22 
It is possible to check the legal uses of a building by viewing the 
building’s Certificate of Occupancy, which can be accessed through the 
                                                                                                                                         
 14. Id. at 1. 
 15. CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 10. 
 16. Martha Galvez & Frank Braconi, New York’s Underground Housing, 9 U. PROSPECT 
1, at 2, http://chpcny.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/UP_Underground_Housing1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T3G4-RRNR]. 
 17. Illegal Conversions, supra note 3. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See generally infra Section I.A. 
 20. See generally infra Section I.B. 
 21. Illegal Conversions, supra note 3. 
 22. Id. 
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DOB website’s Buildings Information System. 23   However, currently, 
enforcement of zoning and building codes occurs through a complaint-
based system where neighbors, tenants, and businesses offering services to 
remove the violations may report suspected illegal conversions by calling 
3-1-1 and anonymously file complaints, prompting a Buildings Inspector to 
inspect the property.24   Property owners that are found in violation of 
zoning and building codes are fined by the DOB.25  Because enforcement 
of building and zoning codes substantially relies on neighbor and tenant 
complaints, the system can perpetuate tension and distrust within local 
communities.26  This distrust may be particularly salient due to the fact that 
penalties for illegally converting a manufacturing or industrial space for 
residential use can be as high as $24,000 for the first offense.27  Although 
NYC collects revenues from these fines, the revenue is unlikely to 
outweigh the costs of inspection, enforcement, housing court hearings, and 
other related costs.28 
NYC has previously had minimal success in its attempted to combat its 
illegal housing.  For example, in March 1997, NYC created a unit of 
thirteen Building Inspectors to ferret out illegal conversions in Queens—
the borough with the most complaints of illegal conversions.29  Between 
1996 and 1998 the number of violation summonses issued across the city 
increased more than six fold, from 637 to 4,094, respectively. 30   But 
increased vigilance has its own complications.  The insufficiency of 
manpower, the DOB officials’ lack of power to enter and vacate illegal 
buildings, and the absence of substitute housing, all contributed to making 
serious enforcement difficult. 
Firstly, there is simply inadequate manpower for code enforcement.  As 
revealed in the 2014 Queens Borough President Policy Statement: 
Today, less than 300 inspectors are on staff citywide, with no staff 
increase projected.  A majority of complaints become response delayed 
because of the inadequate number of inspectors.  Because of these staffing 
shortfalls, The Department of Buildings and the Department of Housing 
Preservation and Development frequently have a backlog of thousands of 
                                                                                                                                         
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 3. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Vivian S. Toy, Despite City Crackdown, Illegal and Overcrowded Apartments 
Survive, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/07/nyregion/despite-
city-crackdown-illegal-and-overcrowded-apartments-survive.html?pagewanted=2 
[https://perma.cc/M69A-TECU]. 
 30. Id. 
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complaints.  Violations go uncorrected, which could lead to building 
collapse and injuries, and millions of dollars in fines go uncollected.  
Without robust enforcement, there is no deterrent to those involved in the 
illegal conversion of housing or the exploitation of those in need of 
affordable housing.31 
The second issue preventing effective enforcement of these codes is that 
enforcement officials cannot enter an apartment without a warrant.  The 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects housing owners and 
tenants from unreasonable searches.32  In Camara v. Municipal Court,33 the 
Supreme Court held that homeowners could refuse to allow housing 
inspectors access to their personal residences until they have obtained a 
search warrant.34  This can apply to homeowners with potential accessory 
dwelling units in NYC. 35   The requirement of a warrant makes the 
verification of illegality difficult.  However, when investigations do reveal 
illegal units, the government typically provides landlords with a “grace 
period” to correct violations, unless the housing conditions are dangerous 
or uninhabitable.36  Thus, even when a violation of zoning and building 
codes is verified, the government can only vacate a premises if there is 
imminent danger. 
The process of going to court over an alleged violation can be very 
expensive.37  However, if the government cannot evacuate the property, 
                                                                                                                                         
 31. MELINDA KATZ, THE OFFICE OF THE QUEENS BOROUGH PRESIDENT: STRATEGY 
POLICY STATEMENT 2014 (2014), 
http://queensbp.org/Queens_Strategic_Policy_Statement_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3AK-
2STF]. 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 1 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).   
See also, e.g., Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the 
Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905 (2009). 
 33. 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967). 
 34. See George J. Castrataro, Housing Code Enforcement: A Century of Failure in New 
York City,14 N.Y. L. F. 60, 63-67 (1968). 
 35. See, e.g., Katie Honan, Half of Illegal Home Subdivision Complaints Are in Queens, 
DNAINFO, (Oct. 28, 2014, 7:24 AM), http://www.dnainfo.com/new-
york/20141028/corona/more-than-half-of-illegal-subdivisions-are-queens-buildings-dept-
says [https://perma.cc/NUV7-LKTB]. 
 36. Galvez & Braconi, supra note 16, at 3. 
 37. See, e.g., Tessa Melvin, Legally or Not, 1-Family House Is Often Home To 2 
Families, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 1995), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/05/realestate/legally-or-not-1-family-house-is-often-
home-to-2-families.html [https://perma.cc/2C7R-G29V] (reporting on a 1995 court case that 
took eleven months and cost taxpayers $10,000 in legal fees). 
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residents will continue to stay there. 38   On many occasions, while the 
landlords violated the zoning and building codes, tenants are forced to stay 
in the illegal premises.  Some landlords use these tenants to their advantage 
by continuing to collect rent from them to help pay government fines.39  
Absent owners may ignore summonses and become repeat offenders to the 
DOB.40  Even worse, however, is when landlords refer to the illegality of 
their housing as an excuse to evict tenants.41 
Thirdly, regardless of the convenience and effectiveness of the 
procedure to eliminate such illegal housing, the NYC government should 
still be concerned about residents of illegal housing who might be 
otherwise homeless.42  Although the DOB is able to issue vacate orders for 
dangerous dwellings, the Department rarely does so due to the lack of 
relocation options.43  During all of fiscal year of 2002, roughly two percent 
of the 10,000 complaints of illegal conversion to the DOB resulted in a 
vacate order.44  Ed Hernandez, a co-chairman of the Long Island Campaign 
for Affordable Housing, commented on this problem in 2003 by stating, “if 
you crack down on one hand and have no alternatives on the other, you’re 
just making the [housing] crisis even more of a crisis.”45 
For all three reasons above, legal enforcement has not worked in NYC.  
Despite government efforts, the number of illegal units has continued to 
increase through the decades.46  The ineffectiveness of legal enforcement 
has not significantly improved over the years either.  In 1997 then-Queens 
Borough President Claire Schulman convened the Queens Illegal 
Conversion Task Force to address the problem of illegal apartment 
conversions in Queens.47  Of the ten houses with illegal apartments closely 
followed for a year by this Illegal Conversion Task Force, all but two of the 
houses continued to have illegal conditions, despite repeated citations and 
fines.48  In at least five cases, the owners neither paid the fines nor made 
                                                                                                                                         
 38. Toy, Despite City Crackdown, Illegal and Overcrowded Apartments Survive, supra 
note 29. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. (providing the example of a tenant of an illegal housing unit who said “I only get 
$552 a month in Social Security and my rent is $400, so where else am I going to go?”). 
 43. Galvez & Braconi, supra note 16, at 3 
 44. Id. at 3. 
 45. Vivian S. Toy, Unraveling the Issue of Illegal Apartments, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 8, 
2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/08/nyregion/unraveling-the-issue-of-illegal-
apartments.html [https://perma.cc/58ML-DNVW]. 
 46. PRATT-CHHAYA REPORT, supra note 13, at 1. 
 47. Galvez & Braconi, supra note 16, at 2. 
 48. Toy, Despite City Crackdown, Illegal and Overcrowded Apartments Survive, supra 
note 29. 
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changes to the property.49  According to Patricia Dolan, president of the 
Kew Gardens Hills Homeowners’ Civic Association,  “[w]e’ve got more 
inspectors and a lot more violations on the books, but there’s still nothing 
to force compliance and make people correct dangerous situations.”50 
B. Legalization:  Uncertain Effects 
With the scarcity of affordable housing in NYC, some housing 
advocates are calling for a new approach.  Legalization is the other way 
scholars and policy advocates have proposed to resolve the illegal housing 
problem, and has made it onto the agenda of housing groups. 51  These 
advocates argue that legalizing at least some of these illegally converted 
units by waiving certain legal requirements in zoning and building codes 
would have a number of benefits for NYC.52  It would ensure fire safety 
and health compliance of accessory units, reduce the cost of responding to 
complaints with multiple inspections, and enhance ability to accommodate 
and plan for population growth through allocation of resources to area 
public schools, sanitation, parking capacity, and development.  In response 
to these advocates, Mayor Bill de Blasio has singled out illegal basements 
and “granny flats” as possible additions to the city’s rent-regulated housing 
stock,53 perhaps drawing on his experience living in a questionably legal 
basement apartment in Astoria, Queens, in the 1980s. 54   However, it 
remains unclear how de Blasio is going to legalize such illegal housing.  
According to the NYC Housing Plan: 
There are thousands of unsanctioned housing units across the city, 
primarily in basements and above garages.  The conditions of these units 
may represent a threat to health and safety of their occupants and to the 
first responders who may be called to respond to emergencies in those 
units.  The engineering and fire safety challenges created by these units 
are extremely complex.  The City will work with the relevant stakeholders 
to examine how best to bring these units into the regulated housing 
system, including a review of other cities’ best practices to bring fresh 
ideas to the discussion.55 
                                                                                                                                         
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Galvez & Braconi, supra note 16; CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1; PRATT-
CHHAYA REPORT, supra note 13. 
 52. Navarro, supra note 4. 
 53. Esmé E. Deprez, Illegal NYC Homes Thrive as De Blasio Tackles Housing, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Nov. 21, 2013) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-
21/illegal-nyc-homes-thrive-as-de-blasio-tackles-housing [https://perma.cc/64V3-79HF]. 
 54. Navarro, supra note 4. 
 55. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HOUSING NEW YORK: A FIVE-BOROUGH, TEN-YEAR PLAN 
47 (2014), http://www.nyc.gov/html/housing/assets/downloads/pdf/housing_plan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KCX5-YBG5]. 
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The Pratt Center and Chhaya CDC recommend NYC “offer landlords 
who agree to legalize their basement apartments as accessory dwelling 
units a reasonable (e.g., 12–18 month) grace period during which they will 
not be subject to penalties for illegal occupancy under the Building 
Code.”56  They also recommend strengthened enforcement and financial 
assistance to illegal housing landlords and tenants, to encourage 
legalization.57  It seems to be a majority opinion among scholars and policy 
makers that legalization should occur. 58   The American Planning 
Association (APA) has even provided a model code for legalization.59  
Scholars have examined the political opposition to legalization,60 but the 
consequences of legalization have not been examined in detail and 
therefore might be not as simple of a solution as it seems.  As 
acknowledged by the APA report, owners of Accessory Dwelling Units 
(ADUs) “strongly resist legalization out of their fear of higher property 
taxes, legal sanctions, income taxes on rental income, the costs of 
conforming to local codes, and the possibility that code inspectors will 
discover a variety of code violations.  For these reasons, programs to 
accommodate illegal ADUs have not been very successful.”61 
Many communities in Westchester County, New York, and Connecticut 
have had legalization programs as a response to the special problems of 
elderly people owning large homes and the increasing number of young 
people seeking to buy or rent housing.62  There were also a few legalization 
programs in towns on Long Island, New York, but residents questioned 
whether any illegal landlord would voluntarily submit to paying the 
required fee and having his or her property inspected.63  In Suffolk County, 
New York, the Town of Babylon and its incorporated village of 
Lindenhurst have amended their zoning codes to legalize accessory 
                                                                                                                                         
 56. PRATT-CHHAYA REPORT, supra note 13, at 1. 
 57. See id. at 1. 
 58. See, e.g., Dan Hafetz et al., BACKGROUND GUIDE ON HOW TO LEGALIZE CELLAR 
APARTMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY (2009), 
https://basecampaign.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/background-guide-on-how-to-legalize-
cellar-apartments-in-new-york-city-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/B397-DBQX]. 
 59. See RODNEY L. COBB & SCOTT DVORAK, ACCESSORY DWELLING UNITS: MODEL 
STATE ACT AND LOCAL ORDINANCE (2000), 
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/consume/d17158_dwell.pdf [https://perma.cc/L87U-VJJ5]. 
 60. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, A Room of One’s Own? 
Accessory Dwelling Unit Reforms and Local Parochialism, 45 URB. LAW. 519 (2013). 
 61. COBB & DVORAK, supra note 59, at 49-50. 
 62. Id. (adapting a proposal for ADU legalization from a 1995 draft of the Village of 
Scarsdale, New York’s Zoning Code, §4.7.1.g. of South Winsor, Connecticut’s 1990 Zoning 
Ordinance, and §701 m of Hamden, Connecticut’s 1996 Zoning Regulations) 
 63. See Bret Senft, Restricting Illegal Apartments, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 1989)，  
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/24/nyregion/restricting-illegal-apartments.html 
[https://perma.cc/XCP4-XW64]. 
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apartments.64  Although each of these suggested legalization programs have 
implemented a system of permits and fees to allow for conversions,65 
planning officials in these towns and counties have noted that compliance 
has been slow. 66  Residents who converted their homes before these codes 
took effect (when it was still illegal) are particularly slow to comply with 
new codes because of the fear that municipalities will require costly 
renovations to their apartments to conform to approved standards, and the 
fear of disapproval from surrounding neighbors.67  In essence, legalization 
programs in the 1980s were predominantly failures. 68   For example, a 
legalization program in Old Tappan, New Jersey, was met with a 
disappointingly meager number of applications.69  In the codes written to 
address the legalization programs, local governments often outlined 
comprehensive procedures to ensure the quality and safety of the legalized 
buildings and to charge the owners for the legalization.  Although both are 
reasonable requirements, many illegal housing owners did not like the extra 
financial burden of these requirements, and therefore would not 
cooperate.70  What is more, legalization policies and laws might be tailored 
to address the concern of legal housing owners in the neighborhood, 
resulting in stricter compliance requirements.  These might further deter 
illegal housing owners from applying for legalization.71 
Although there have been some seemingly successful legalization 
programs, the amount of illegal housing that such programs have addressed 
and the scale of such programs are too small to adequately assess whether 
these programs could be successful in New York City.  For example, Santa 
Cruz’s ADU Development Program, which has won numerous awards and 
has been used as a model by other communities, averages forty to fifty 
ADU permits per year.72  Similarly, Barnstable, Massachusetts’ Accessory 
                                                                                                                                         
 64. Article II: Accessory Apartments in One-Family Dwellings, 1995 Babylon Local 
Law No. 14, Babylon Admin. Legislation §153, art. II., http://ecode360.com/6808107 
[https://perma.cc/CB6S-UHDM] (“It is the purpose of this article to encourage the residents 
of our community who require accessory apartments to legally remain in the Town of 
Babylon.”). 
 65. See supra notes 63 and 64. 
 66. Gene Rondinaro, Illegal Accessory Units Trouble Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 
1985)，  http://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/03/realestate/illegal-accessory-units-trouble-
suburbs.html [https://perma.cc/FB8V-QC9H]. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. (noting how Old Tappan’s then-mayor commented how the lack of applications 
was “a shame when there is now a perfectly legal method of having it done”). 
 70. See id. 
 71. See Senft, supra note 63. 
 72. See generally U.S DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF 
POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, ACCESSORY DWELLING UNITS: CASE STUDY (2008), 
http://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/adu.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR8A-WNLW]. 
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Affordable Apartment or Amnesty Program, part of their Affordable 
Housing Plan from 2000, has also been highlighted as an exemplary way to 
bring the high number of existing illegal ADUs into compliance with 
current requirements. 73   While the program has been successful in 
converting existing illegal accessory apartments into code-compliant 
ADUs, in the eight years after its inception, Barnstable has approved only 
160 affordable ADUs—roughly twenty ADUs per year.74  Going at these 
rates, it would take more than 2,000 years in Santa Cruz, and 5,000 years in 
Barnstable to legalize the 100,000 illegal apartments estimated by The Pratt 
Center and Chhaya CDC.75 
In sum, the NYC government would have more manpower and higher 
capacity to deal with illegal housing if similar programs were adopted, but 
the small numbers in the so-called successful programs discussed above do 
not provide a solid basis to make predictions.  Instead, the information 
costs, politics over externality, and heterogeneity of the illegal housing 
sector would be much more significant and complicated in NYC than in 
these small towns and cities where implementation has been moderately 
successful. 
C. Challenges to Illegal Housing in New York City 
1. Information Costs 
Concealed within the City’s seemingly endless rows of apartment 
buildings, townhouses, and high-rises is a network of typologies that have 
adapted, subdivided, or converted existing spaces to accommodate the 
growing number of individuals who cannot find a place to live within the 
formal housing market.76  With owners unwilling to reveal that they have 
these units for fear of being cited with a violation and tenants not daring to 
report possible unsafe conditions for fear of eviction, it is not easy to 
quantify just how many of these underground units exist in New York City 
and what they look like.77  Information cost is an obvious challenge to 
dealing with the illegal housing issue in New York City.  This information 
cost refers not only to gathering information about buildings, but also to 
information about the social relations surrounding housing, including 
renting contracts and property arrangements.  New York courts have 
addressed various issues of illegal housing, such as whether a landlord is 
                                                                                                                                         
 73. Id. at 5. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 3. 
 76. See Wesseler, supra note 11. 
 77. PRATT-CHHAYA REPORT, supra note 13, at 2. 
12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
liable for a tenant’s illegal conversions,78 whether a tenant of an illegal 
apartment is entitled to the government’s relocation assistance, 79  and 
whether owners could recover value of use and occupancy of premises in 
illegal conversion.80  These cases testify to the complicated property and 
social arrangements involved in illegal housing. A top-down and unified 
approach to deal with problems of illegal housing would require 
cooperation and information from illegal housing owners and tenants. 
2. Externality 
Although city planners might perceive economic and social benefits of 
ADUs, surrounding neighbors often fear the exact opposite: That the 
increased density and traffic in their neighborhoods resulting from the units 
will cause a decline in their property values. 81   In fact, neighborhood 
residents dislike illegal housing so much that they voluntarily “watchdog 
and police the community” for illegal renters in the absence of legal 
enforcement.82  Residents’ fears have some merit, however, as additional 
housing imposes a disproportionate drain on municipal services such as 
roads, sanitary services, and schools.83 
3. Heterogeneity 
The conditions of illegal housing in New York City, as revealed by 
Chhaya CDC, vary case-by-case: some are safe and meet the Building 
Code, some could easily be made safe and habitable, and some are 
fundamentally inappropriate for habitation—lacking natural light, proper 
ventilation, or safe forms of egress—and could not be made habitable 
                                                                                                                                         
 78. See Matter of Kurtin v. City of New York, 78 A.D.3d 473, 911 N.Y.S.2d 40 (App. 
Div. 2010). 
 79. See Matter of Smith v. Donovan, 61 A.D.3d 505, 878 N.Y.S.2d 675 (App. Div. 
2009). 
 80. See Caldwell v. American Package, 57 A.D.3d 15, 866 N.Y.S.2d 275 (App. Div. 
2008). 
 81. See Frank Bruni & Deborah Sontag, Behind a Suburban Facade in Queens, A 
Teeming, Angry Urban Arithmetic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 1996), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/08/nyregion/behind-a-suburban-facade-in-queens-a-
teeming-angry-urban-arithmetic.html [https://perma.cc/N2J6-JY6G] (quoting a community 
resident who stated “The house that used to send two kids to school sends eight . . . . This 
has created havoc with the quality of life in our community”); Morris Newman, Focus: 
Riverside, Calif.; The Welcome Mat’s Out for ‘Granny Flats’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 1991), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/25/realestate/focus-riverside-calif-the-welcome-mat-s-
out-for-granny-flats.html [https://perma.cc/5PHN-JP85]. 
 82. See Marcelle S. Fischler, Fighting In-Home Rentals, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/14/realestate/14lizo.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=142
8895208fJGAPZc9XzdYAjsfJwethg [https://perma.cc/FNY5-HVZT]. 
 83. Id. 
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without major renovations.84  Chhaya CDC surveyors found “many tenants 
living in dangerous and extremely overcrowded conditions in units with 
dilapidated ceilings, poor electrical wiring, and tight living quarters with 
multiple uses that seemed unsafe for habitation.”85  Naturally, these units in 
serious violation of building safety codes would require significantly more 
work to become compliant with the law. 
Residents of illegal housing also vary: there are tenants who live in 
accessory housing temporarily, but also tenants have been living in 
accessory units for many years.86  Families who have been living in ADUs 
for several years are considered an integral part of the local community.87  
Their children are enrolled in local schools, they worship in local faith 
institutions, have family or established friendships with residents in the 
community, and are, in many cases, happy with their communities. 88  
Social classes of illegal housing tenants also vary: While some tenants of 
ADUs are unauthorized immigrants, unemployed, and/or on welfare, some 
are also teachers, nurses or workers at hospitals. 89 
There are therefore also differences in the interests and preferences of 
illegal housing owners.  Some want to get legal title for these units; some 
simply may not care.90  The Chhaya CDC calls for further research that 
would help facilitate the integration of illegal housing into the law, 
“including the projected cost of conversion for [the] average unit, a 
comparative assessment of increase[s] in tax liabilities, costs of conversion 
versus income generated, and impact on long-term property value”;91 and, 
additionally, a “comparative analysis of time and resources for an owner to 
proactively legalize versus responding to a complaint of illegal use.”92  
Such costs would vary by circumstance, and it would be difficult to give a 
unified answer for city-wide illegal housing.  This variance explains why 
some people say they would be the first to apply for legalization if there is 
such a program but, on the other hand, many existing programs have had 
very limited success. 93 
                                                                                                                                         
 84. See CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 4. 
 85. Id. at 9 (noting one instance of an individual spending twelve years in his friend’s 
home). 
 86. Toy, Unraveling the Issue of Illegal Apartments，  supra note 45. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See supra Section I.B. 
 91. CHHAYA CDC, supra note 1, at 2. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Cf. Elissa Gootman, What Lies Behind Door No. 2? In This Town, Don’t Even Ask, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2002), 
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II.  LESSONS FROM SHENZHEN 
Shenzhen is a city similar in size to New York City.  However, it faces 
an even bigger problem of illegal housing: almost half of the housing in the 
city is built in violation of zoning and building codes, and therefore 
illegal.94   In the past three decades the Shenzhen city government has 
implemented various measures to deal with illegal housing while facing the 
same challenges arising from information costs, externality, and 
heterogeneity as in New York City.95  As such, New York City can learn 
from Shenzhen’s experiences dealing with illegal housing.  In this Part, I 
apply Ian Ayre’s optional law framework, 96  which is an expansion of 
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed’s structure of legal 
entitlements97 to analyze illegal housing and adverse zoning, i.e., private 
construction and land use against governmental zoning and building codes.  
This new “optional zoning” approach can be applied to analyze the 
practices of Shenzhen for the past three decades, which adopted five of the 
six rules under the optional zoning framework in dealing with illegal 
housing. The most cost-effective solution is to grant call options, rather 
than titles to illegal housing owners. 
A. Comparability 
Table 1. Comparison of New York City and Shenzhen 
 Population Land 
Population in 
Illegal Housing 
New York City 8,491,07998 783.8 square km99
300,000 to 
500,000100 
Shenzhen 10,628,900101 1996.8 square km102
Up to 8 
million103 
                                                                                                                                         
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/15/nyregion/what-lies-behind-door-no-2-in-this-town-
don-t-even-ask.html [https://perma.cc/484X-6C8R]. 
 94. Qiao, Small Property, Big Market: A Focal Point Explanation，  supra note 5, at 
210. 
 95. See infra Section II.C. 
 96. See generally IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL 
ENTITLEMENTS, 1-4 (2005). 
 97. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 98. See Department of City Planning of New York, Census Bureau Estimates for July 1, 
2014, Population: Current Population Estimates, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/popcur.shtml [https://perma.cc/N58V-9UDJ]. 
 99. See State & County QuickFacts: New York, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3651000.html [https://perma.cc/TZ66-CLBT]. 
 100. See PRATT-CHHAYA REPORT, supra note 13, at 2. 
 101. STATISTICS BUREAU OF SHENZHEN CITY & SHENZHEN SURVEY OFFICE OF THE STATE 
STATISTICS BUREAU, SHENZHEN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2014, Section 1.1.2, 
http://www.sztj.gov.cn/nj2014/indexce.htm [https://perma.cc/5G9Z-EC3S]. 
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Situated immediately north of Hong Kong, in the southern part of 
China’s Guangdong Province, Shenzhen has been considered the symbolic 
heart of the Chinese economic reform.104  In 1980, Deng Xiaoping, the then 
supreme leader of China, designated Shenzhen (then an agriculture county 
of about 300,000 farmers named Bao’An) as a “special economic zone” 
(SEZ) to pilot market-oriented reforms.105  Since the establishment of the 
SEZ, Shenzhen has boomed into economic growth and urbanization.  From 
1979 to 2010, the annual average growth rate of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in Shenzhen was 25.3%.106  Shenzhen ranked fourth in 
GDP and first in GDP per capita among mainland Chinese cities in 2009.107  
The population of Shenzhen has grown from 314,100 in 1979, of whom 
312,600 had local hukou (household registration), to 10,372,000 in 2010, of 
whom only 2,510,300 had local hukou.108 
The exponential population growth also brought huge demand for 
housing, but there was no housing crisis like New York City’s.109   In 
Shenzhen, housing prices are significantly more expensive than can be 
afforded by the majority of the population.110  Most of the eight million 
migrant workers in Shenzhen actually stay in illegal housing, which 
composes 47.57% of the total floor space of Shenzhen.111  Such housing is 
illegal because it violates land use regulations and building codes.  Illegal 
land development has played an indispensable role in the rapid economic 
growth of Shenzhen.112 
                                                                                                                                         
 102. Id. 
 103. Qiao, Small Property, Big Market: A Focal Point Explanation，  supra note 5, at 
197, 201. 
 104. Id. at 207. 
 105. Id. 
 106. SHENZHEN STATISTICS BUREAU & NBS SURVEY OFFICE IN SHENZHEN, SHENZHEN 
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 107. ZHENG LE, THE PATH OF SHENZHEN 16 (2010). 
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106, at 4. 
 109. See generally Shitong Qiao, Planting Houses in Shenzhen: A Real Estate Market 
without Legal Titles, 29 CAN. J.L. & SOC. 253, 258-59 (2014). 
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媒:沪深民众不吃不喝 50 年才够买 100 平米房) [It Takes Residents in Shanghai and 
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SINA NEWS (Sept. 17, 2015) http://news.sina.com.cn/c/zs/2015-09-17/doc-
ifxhytwr2121287.shtml [https://perma.cc/45VM-WSE6]. 
 111. See Qiao, Small Property, Big Market:  A Focal Point Explanation, supra note 5. 
 112. See generally Qiao, Planting Houses in Shenzhen: A Real Estate Market without 
Legal Titles, supra note 109, at 270-71. 
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B. Optional Zoning 
Zoning is the rights of the government to control land and building use.  
Adverse possession is when an individual possesses property owned by 
someone else without his or her permission until the statute of limitations 
expires for the owner to recover possession, which allows the adverse 
possessor to acquire a root of title to that already-owned property. 113  
American law often requires that possession must be exclusive, open and 
notorious, actual, continuous, and adverse under a claim of right.114  Illegal 
land use can, therefore, be called “adverse zoning” by land users by 
applying the adverse possession concept to government-held property 
interests. 115   We can explore how to structure the legal entitlements 
between illegal land users and the government under the framework of 
adverse possession.116 
The concept of adverse possession can be extended beyond the 
possession of things.  For example, the revival of recent research on 
adverse possession was partly attributed to a California Supreme Court 
decision about prescriptive easement.117  Related to adverse possession, 
prescription is “the effect of lapse of time in creating or extinguishing 
property interests.”118  It is based on the theory that if “one makes non-
permissive use of another’s land, and the landowner fails to prevent such 
use, such acquiescence is conclusive evidence that the user is rightful”.119  
A prescriptive easement is created “by such use of land, for the period of 
prescription, as would be privileged if an easement existed, provided its use 
is (1) adverse, and (2) for the period of prescription, continuous and 
uninterrupted.”120 
Thomas Merrill calls prescriptive easement a first cousin of adverse 
possession.121  Prescriptive easement and adverse possession are different 
in that the former involves nonpossessory use of property which ripens into 
                                                                                                                                         
 113. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. 
LAW: PROPERTY 34 (2010). 
 114. Id. at 35. 
 115. Scott Andrew Shepard, Adverse Possession, Private-Zoning Waiver & Desuetude: 
Abandonment & Recapture of Property and Liberty Interests, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 557, 
558 (2011). 
 116. See id. 
 117. Warsaw v. Chicago Metallic Ceilings, Inc.,.35 Cal. 3d 564, 676 P.2d 584, 199 Cal. 
Rptr. 773 (1984).  See also Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Adverse 
Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV., 1122, 1122–54 (1985). 
 118. William G. Ackerman & Shane T. Johnson, Outlaws of the Past: A Western 
Perspective on Prescription and Adverse Possession, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 79, 86 
(1996). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Ackerman & Johnson, supra note 118, at 86–87. 
 121. Merrill, supra note 117, at 1124. 
2017] DEALING WITH ILLEGAL HOUSING 17 
an easement and the latter involves possession of property which ripens 
into a fee simple.122  Though the non-possessory nature of an easement 
generally means that the continuity and exclusivity elements should be 
interpreted differently than in a case of adverse possession, the same legal 
requirements apply to both adverse possession and prescriptive easements.  
Scholars often do not distinguish too sharply between the rules of legal 
entitlements under adverse possession and prescriptive easement. 123  
Probably due to the more significant role adverse possession plays in 
property law, discussions of “the effect of lapse of time in creating or 
extinguishing property interests” are more often under the framework of 
adverse possession. 
As Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed wrote, the first issue that 
any legal system must face is the problem of “entitlement.”124   When 
presented with conflicting interests of two or more individuals or groups of 
individuals, a state must decide which side to favor and the kind of 
protection to grant to that side.125  Calabresi and Melamed define three 
types of entitlements: entitlements protected by property rules, entitlements 
protected by liability rules, and inalienable entitlements.126  Property rules 
protect entitlements by deterring nonconsensual takings.127  As such, an 
entitlement is protected by a property rule when an individual who wants to 
take an entitlement from another must buy it from a voluntary seller at an 
agreed upon price. 128   Liability rules, on the other hand, protect 
entitlements by compensating the entitlement holder when such takings in 
fact occur.129  Therefore, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule when 
an individual who wants to take an entitlement from another can destroy 
the initial entitlement if individual is willing to pay an objectively 
determined value for it. 
Merrill firstly applied the Calabresi-Melamed framework to analyze 
adverse possession. 130   Adopting this approach to analyzing adverse 
zoning, the state can choose among four different rules. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 122. Ackerman & Johnson, supra note 118, at 88. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 97, at 1090-92. 
 125. Id. at 1092. 
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 127. AYRES, supra note 96 at 5. 
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Table 2: Calabresi and Melamed’s Two-by-Two Box Applied to 
Adverse Zoning131 
 
 Method of Protection
Initial Entitlement Property Rule Liability Rule 
The Government Rule 1 Rule 2 
Adverse Zoners Rule 3 Rule 4 
 
 Rule 1:  Government prohibits adverse zoning—the government’s 
zoning cannot be violated. 
 Rule 2:  Government has the zoning power, but individuals can 
violate it by paying compensation. 
 Rule 3:  Government recognizes adverse zoning without 
requirements of compensation. 
 Rule 4:  Government recognizes adverse zoning, but can get rid of it 
by compensating individuals. 
 
The Calabresi and Melamed categorization has since dominated the 
discussions of legal entitlements—scholars have discussed different aspects 
of these rules, tried to expand their content and even invented new rules.132  
Among many others, Ian Ayres significantly expanded the content of 
liability rules by introducing option theory into this field.133  To define an 
option, it needs to be determined who has the option, whether the option is 
to buy (a “call option”) or to sell (a “put option”), and the price of 
exercising the option.134  The individual who has the call option can force a 
sale at this exercise price, even if the seller does not want to sell. 135  
According to Ayres, traditional liability rules that give at least one party an 
option to take an entitlement non-consensually and pay the entitlement 
owner some exercise price gives potential takers a call option.  With this 
reconception of traditional liability rules as granting a potential taker a call 
option, academics began conceptualizing put options in this context.  Here, 
                                                                                                                                         
 131. For a similar table, see AYRES, supra note 96, at 14. 
 132. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante 
View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001); Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Pliability Rule, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2002); Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
713 (1996); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The 
Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (1995); Saul Levmore, Unifying 
Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 YALE. L.J. 2149 (1997). 
 133. See AYRES, supra note 96, at 5–15. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 15. 
2017] DEALING WITH ILLEGAL HOUSING 19 
put options would give the option holder the choice of whether to be paid a 
non-negotiated amount, giving rise to “forced purchases.” 
Applied to adverse zoning, the possibility of put options suggests two 
additional rules: 
 
 Rule 5: Government grants titles to adverse zoners, but also gives 
them the option of waiving their titles in return for compensation 
from the government. 
 Rule 6: Government not only can keep its entitlement to zoning, but 
also has the option to give up its entitlement and receive 
compensation from adverse zoners. 
 
Incorporating the possibility of “put-option” rules, the structure of legal 
entitlements in adverse zoning is as following: 
 
Table 3: Ayres’ Two-by-Three Box Applied to Adverse Zoning136 
 
 Method of Protection 
Initial 
Entitlement 
Property Rule Liability Rule 
Call Option
Liability Rule 
Put Option 
The Government Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 6 
Adverse Zoners Rule 3 Rule 4 Rule 5 
According to the distribution of assets and options, the structure of legal 
entitlements in adverse zoning can be depicted as follows: 
 
Table 4: Ayres’ Table of Claims137 Applied to Adverse Zoning 
 
 Govt’s Claim AZ’s Claim 
Rule 1 Zoning  0 
Rule 2 Zoning - Call Option Call Option 
Rule 3 0 Adverse Zoning 
Rule 4 Call Option Adverse Zoning - Call 
Option 
Rule 5 - Put Option Adverse Zoning + Put 
Option 
Rule 6 Zoning + Put Option - Put Option 
                                                                                                                                         
 136. For a similar table, see AYRES, supra note 96, at 16; 
 137. See AYRES, supra note 96, at 17. 
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C. Practices in Shenzhen 
In Shenzhen, each village has a shareholding co-op at the core their 
community.  These co-ops are responsible for managing the collective 
development land and issue dividends to villagers at the end of each 
year.138  Income generated by the land funds a variety of public works.  
Members of village co-op boards are typically well-known figures in the 
community, creating a sense of familiarity and giving the co-ops intimate 
knowledge of local property arrangements, knowledge that external 
government branches would otherwise be unable to access.139  In addition 
to their superior access, co-ops benefit from fewer formal constraints than 
other government entities.140 
Village co-ops are willing to provide information and support for illegal 
housing transactions because of economic incentives.  They keep records of 
village building histories in the form of property maps, meeting minutes, or 
sales receipts, and determine property rights in illegal buildings.141  It is the 
village co-ops that decide and coordinate how much to build in the villages, 
and represent villagers in negotiating with the government on rezoning.142 
As early as in 1982, the Shenzhen government tried to make a feasible 
plan to deal with the illegal rural houses.143  In dealing with the village co-
ops, the Shenzhen government has tried five of the six rules under optional 
zoning framework in the past decades.144  The only missing rule in the 
Shenzhen government policies, Rule 5, is actually applicable to a certain 
group of cases.  Shenzhen demonstrates that neither Rule 1 nor Rule 3 
works in dealing with adverse zoning: to demolish illegal housing is too 
costly to achieve, and granting illegal housing legal titles for free 
encourages more illegal land use.145  Instead, it is more cost-effective and 
feasible to grant the government the initial entitlement to zoning, rather 
than individual land users, and therefore Rule 2 (granting call options to 
illegal housing owners) is the most efficient policy.146  In the following I 
present a detailed analysis of the six rules in Shenzhen.  
                                                                                                                                         
 138. Qiao, Planting Houses in Shenzhen:  A Real Estate Market without Legal Titles, 
supra note 109, at 260. 
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 140. Id. at 260-61. 
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1. Neither Legal Enforcement nor Legalization Works:  The Limitation of 
Rule 1, Rule 3 and Rule 6  
Legal enforcement, i.e., Rule 1, has proved to be too costly for the 
government.  From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, the Shenzhen government 
promulgated a series of regulations to deal with illegal land use. 147  
However, in the face of prevalent illegal land use, the government’s 
enforcement power seemed limited.  A typical illegal building demolition 
involves dozens of government employees, including construction workers 
who are responsible for demolition and policemen who maintain order 
during the demolition. 148   Each demolition is a battle between the 
government and villagers, which frequently results in bloody conflicts.149  
Despite the time and energy put into each demolition, the number of illegal 
buildings continued to increase over time.150   From 1999 to 2010, the 
number of illegal buildings grew from 221,600 to 348,400.151  The huge 
expense of demolition has become unaffordable for the government.  In 
March of 2013, the local People’s Congress published a draft of 
“Regulation of Land Use Monitoring”, which required the owners of illegal 
buildings to pay the demolition fees.  In order to do that, the Department of 
Land Use Monitoring could take the owners’ properties, such as 
automobiles, legal real estate, and bank savings, as lien.152 
Although the Shenzhen government may have circumvented the costs of 
demolition, the larger issue is that illegal housing is too interconnected with 
the normal functioning of the city to fail.  These buildings essentially 
provide affordable shelter to the middle-and-low income population, such 
as taxi drivers, factory workers, and even young white-collar workers, and 
sometime even space for small high-tech start-ups.153  Rents of such illegal 
                                                                                                                                         
 147. Shitong Qiao, Small Property, Adverse Possession and Optional Law, in LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 290, 303-06 (Yun-chien Chang Ed., 2015). 
 148. Fu Ke (付可), Shenzhen Chaichu Sifang zao Dizhi Duoming Jingcha Shoushang (深
圳拆除私房遭抵制多名警察受伤) [Many Polices Got Hurt in Demolition of Private 
Houses], SOUTHERN METROPOLITAN DAILY, (Jan. 23, 2007), 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/l/2007-01-23/115112115150.shtml [https://perma.cc/K7LC-
WQST]. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. SHENZHEN CITY GOVERNMENT, INVESTIGATION REPORT ON ILLEGAL BUILDINGS IN 
SHENZHEN 26 (2010) (on file with the author). 
 152. Peng Yan (彭琰), Qiangchai Feiyong you Weijianren Chu (强拆费用由违建人出) 
[New Regulations Draft Require Owners of Illegal Buildings to Pay for the Demolition 
Expenses], SHENZHEN COMMERCIAL DAILY (Mar. 12, 2013), 
http://szsb.sznews.com/html/2013-03/12/content_2401448.htm [https://perma.cc/6K3M-
JSFU]. 
 153. Qiao, Planting Houses in Shenzhen: A Real Estate Market without Legal Titles, 
supra note 109, at 266. 
22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
buildings are also the main income of over 300,000 indigenous villagers, 
whose interests cannot be easily disregarded.154 
After legal enforcement proved to be ineffective, the Shenzhen city 
government also tried legalization.  Its free-titling policy, which is 
essentially Rule 3, has been mainly limited to a “one household, one 
house” policy. 155   This legalization policy also failed.  In addition to 
effectively encouraging illegal land use, the Shenzhen government gained 
very little revenue from this policy and was embarrassed that its policy 
benefited law-violators rather than law-abiders.156 
First, villagers had to devote substantial resources to obtain a permit to 
build a house, regardless of whether they had already built one or not.157  
Getting a permit sometimes depended on how a “household” is defined.  
One house could be divided into two households just to get the benefits 
from the “one household, one house” policy.158  Many resources were spent 
on lobbying and bribing government officials with authority to issue such 
permits.159  Second, many people viewed this and other policies which 
provide mechanisms for villagers to legalize their illegal real estate as a 
signal that the government was unable to enforce harsh demolition rules 
and would have to grant legal titles to all illegal buildings.160  Villagers 
responded with more illegal land use to secure their claims of rights in the 
possible situation of free-titling-for-all.161  This desire to secure property in 
case of free titling was the main reason that each time the Shenzhen 
                                                                                                                                         
 154. Id., at 15. 
 155. SHENZHEN CITY GOVERNMENT, supra note 151. 
 156. Qiao, Small Property, Adverse Possession and Optional Law, supra note 147, at 
308. 
 157. See Sun Zhongchun ( 孙 中 春 ), Shenzhen Longgang Jiedao “Shequ ti 
Xiaochanquanfang Shenqing Fugongpai” (深圳龙岗街道“社区替小产权房申请复工牌”) 
[Street Office Applied for License to Build Small-Property Houses], SHENZHEN EVENING 
NEWSPAPER (Oct. 18, 2010), http://szhome.oeeee.com/a/20101018/316592_2.html 
[https://perma.cc/QYR5-663C]; Xie Xiaoguo et al. (谢孝国 等), Shenzhenshi Jianzhu 4 
cheng Weigui, Liyi Jituan Youshui Shizhang (深圳市建筑 4 成违规 利益集团游说市长) 
[40% of Shenzhen’s Buildings are Illegal, Interest Groups Lobby the Mayor of Shenzhen for 
Illegal Buildings], YANG CHEN EVENING NEWSPAPER (Feb. 24, 2010), 
http://www.fwwwd.com/content/2010-02/24/content_4412896_3.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ZB68-RYK6]. 
 158. See Foreign Capital Involved in Illegal Housing in Shenzhen: Even Tycoons Are 
Selling Uniformly Constructed Buildings (深圳违建房竟有“外资”介入 富豪也倒卖统建楼
), NEW EXPRESS (September 13, 2013), 
http://szhome.oeeee.com/html/201309/13/18669.html [https://perma.cc/W6FF-C2V9]. 
 159. Xie Xiaoguo et al., supra note 157. 
 160. Qiao, Small Property, Adverse Possession and Optional Law, supra note 147, at 
307-8. 
 161. Id. at 308. 
2017] DEALING WITH ILLEGAL HOUSING 23 
government initiated a campaign to deal with illegal buildings, there was a 
burst of illegal land use.162 
The Shenzhen government also promulgated a local regulation allowing 
villagers to keep their illegal houses after paying fines and land-use fees—
essentially Rule 6 under the optional zoning framework.  The 
comprehensive plan included standards of fines and fees were again set 
according to owners’ identities and the total areas of the buildings, and 
provided that legal title for each illegal building would have a price after 
calculation.163  Owners of illegal buildings were required to apply for legal 
titles from the government within one year of the decree’s promulgation, 
giving the Shenzhen government information on illegal buildings within its 
jurisdiction.164  This did not work out well.  The regulation was made in 
2001, and it took the Shenzhen government nine years to gather their first 
detailed report on illegal buildings, only to conclude that, despite 
substantial efforts, the regulation had not been well received by illegal 
housing owners.  Although there were other owners of illegal buildings 
who applied for legalization, by 2010, only about one quarter of the 
221,600 illegal buildings built before 1999 were granted legal titles, and the 
total number of illegal buildings had increased to 348,400.165 
The information costs required to enforce the put-option liability rule are 
too high for the government to enforce.  The government would need to 
impossibly accumulate all the information on all illegal buildings within its 
jurisdiction.  While physical information regarding the location, height and 
floor areas are not difficult to collect, the collection of information 
regarding the history, quality and other less tangible characters of the 
illegal buildings are very costly.166  Even more costly than these intangible 
factors, however, is collecting information regarding the social and 
economic relations of the illegal buildings (e.g. who owns them, and who 
should get legal title). 
The most costly information gathering, however, is determining how 
much an owner values their property. The cost of strategic bargaining could 
be prohibitively high, particularly when the government exercised its put 
option and thus had no opportunity to know the owner’s evaluation.  For 
owners of illegal buildings, the complicated titling procedures imposed 
high information costs on them and fostered distrust of the government, 
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both of which might prevent owners from even thinking about whether the 
fees and fines charged by the government are reasonable.167 
In summary, there might be a price that both the government and 
adverse zoners would accept for legalization of the illegal buildings, but the 
government’s put option is too costly to exercise.  To make sure that the 
price was set right, the government had to design complicated rules, which 
in turn caused great information costs to villagers. 
2. Too Expensive for the Government to Buy:  The Limitation of Rule 4 
and Rule 5 
Under Rule 4, the government can grant legal titles to owners of illegally 
developed buildings, but retains the option to take these buildings provided 
it compensates the owners. The Shenzhen government has tried this 
approach in fulfilling its obligation to provide affordable housing.  
Although the Chinese central government has required local governments 
to build low-income public housing, the Shenzhen government did not have 
enough land to comply.168  The Shenzhen government found that, rather 
than developing extra houses, requisitioning small-property houses might 
more appropriate for their city where most low-income people lived in 
illegal housing.169  Under this plan, setting a proper price is also a key issue.  
Social conflicts would arise if the government insisted on requisitioning the 
illegal houses with too little compensation.  The costs of information and 
bargaining to set the proper price could be high.  On the other hand, the 
Shenzhen government could not afford to purchase over 400 million square 
meters of illegal buildings with a reasonable price.170  Regardless, the goal 
of “requisitioning illegal buildings for public housing” is questionable.  If 
illegal housing was adequate public housing and indeed served as homes to 
low-income population through the small-property market, why should the 
government become the owner? 
Under Rule 5, adverse zoners would not only have the legal title, but 
also an option to waive their titles in return for government compensation.  
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The Shenzhen government has not taken such a rule in dealing with illegal 
land use in its history.171 
3. Optional Zoning That Works:  Rule 2  
Of the six adverse zoning rules, the most successful and promising 
solution has been Rule 2, wherein the government keeps its entitlement to 
zoning, but adverse zoners can take it by paying compensation.172  The use 
of this rule emerged over time through Shenzhen’s various village 
redevelopment projects.173  In the process of redeveloping villages where 
illegal land development was prevalent, the Shenzhen government insisted 
that only legally-developed land could be redeveloped and only legally-
built houses could be compensated. 174   However, it was clear to the 
government and other individuals that village redevelopment regardless of 
whether it was on legally-developed land, would bring big profits through 
modernization. 175   Because of this, the government began to ignore 
whether redeveloped buildings were legal or illegal as long as the project 
can supply 20% of its land to the government for free and develop another 
12% of land for public roads and other public facilities.176 
While the government has the entitlement to regulating and limiting 
development on the land, Rule 2 provides an option for the villagers to pay 
the fixed price (i.e., 32% of its land) to the government for legal rights to 
develop the remaining land.177  In this scenario, the government does not 
need to do much—the villagers know the value of their land best, the 
government should not have to waste resources to find this information.  
Compared with the reluctance received by other legalization plans, 
villagers have actively applied for village redevelopment, resulting in 342 
projects between 2009 and 2012 involving 30 square kilometers of 
illegally-developed land, and in 2011 alone such projects contributed 
almost 40% of newly-developed residential housing in 2011.178 
This rule differs from the government’s put-option liability rule in 
several key aspects.  First, this approach places the decision-making power 
with villagers, who are both more attuned to opportunities in the market, as 
well as more aware of the real estate under their control.179  Second, titling 
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becomes a continuous process under this rule, allowing villagers to decide 
whether to exercise their call option based on real market opportunities, 
rather theoretical predictions. 180   This flexibility in timing can even 
counteract the negative effects of the government’s potential bad pricing 
that villagers would be subject to where the government exercises its put 
option.  Instead, Rule 2 allows the villagers to exercise their options 
anytime based on market opportunities, prices of real estate, and do not 
have to rely on the price of exercising the call option at a certain point in 
time.181  While the government could also choose the timing of exercising 
its put option, it is more difficult to choose the right time without knowing 
the villagers’ information.  Thus Rule 2 leaves the decision to the party 
with better information.182 
CONCLUSION:  COMMUNITY-BASED ZONING OPTIONS 
How should cities allocate legal entitlements efficiently?  Ayres’ 
optional law theory tells us that: “Liability rules delegate allocational 
authority—allocational options—to privately informed disputants.  The 
delegation effect gives us strong reasons to believe that liability rules do a 
better job than property rules in harnessing the private information of 
disputants.”183  Applying this theory to address illegal housing in NYC, I 
argue that the government should grant illegal housing owners options to 
buy legal titles rather than providing blanket, direct legalization. 
While the government knows its own needs and valuation of the right to 
zone, individual owners have the information about their illegal housing.  
The government has two roles in this case: one as a disputant and potential 
entitlement holder, the other as a policymaker who can determine who has 
to decide the final allocation of entitlements.  The government as 
policymaker in this case has complete information about one disputant—
the government—but does not have enough information about numerous 
illegal dwelling units and their occupants’ valuations of them, which are 
more diverse and speculative than the government’s valuations. 
New York City can learn several things from Shenzhen.  First, decisions 
about illegal housing should be made at the community level because 
externality is mostly a community-level issue, and local communities are 
better at monitoring individual land uses than the city government.  Second, 
neither legal enforcement nor traditional legalization is going to effectively 
solve the problem of illegal housing.  Private land users have an 
informational advantage and greater control over their land compared to the 
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government, which makes effective legal enforcement against prevalent 
zoning violations almost impossible.  “Traditional legalization” here can be 
categorized into two rules: legalization without any charges on illegal 
housing owners (i.e., Rule 3), and imposed legalization with charges on 
illegal housing owners (i.e., Rule 6), which is the forced sale of the legal 
title by the government to the adverse zoners.  Application of Rule 3 
jeopardizes the integrity of zoning, ignores the negative externality that 
adverse zoning imposes on the community and the city, and encourages 
adverse zoning without effective checking on private land use.  Application 
of Rule 6 faces the challenges brought by heterogeneity, such as making it 
impossible to set a price that would work for all adverse zoners.  The 
government should have the initial entitlement to zoning generally but can 
create zoning options for illegal housing owners.  It would be financially 
burdensome for the government to pay individual land users for zoning.  
Instead, adverse zoning should only be applicable in limited cases, and 
should be auctioned at the community level.184  Members who exercise 
these options need to pay the community for the extra burden caused by 
crowding, traffic, garbage collection, etc. 
Essentially, the government should decide who decides, rather than 
deciding the final allocation of resources.  Options, instead of titles, should 
be granted to individual adverse zoners as they are more numerous and 
more capable of multiple takings than collective decision-makers, and have 
private information and the more speculative valuation of the land, both of 
which are less known to the government and the community. 
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